A strategy at
odds with the world community
Commentary by ADAM
TANOUS
Former
President Clinton once remarked in an interview that George W. Bush’s
political acumen should not be underestimated. The implication was that
the naïve, country boy aura of the current president is not what it
seems. And as time goes on, it would appear that Clinton knew what he
was talking about.
Bush,
indeed, seems to have a firm grasp of the dynamics of national politics.
Where he seems to be lacking is in an understanding or perhaps just an
appreciation of international politics. The Iraq debate provides an
example of Bush’s astute national politicking working against our
international interests and goals.
It is
quite evident that the president is determined to do something about
Saddam Hussein, his government and weapons. Some argue that Bush decided
long ago that he would use military force to remove Hussein from power;
others are convinced that military force is simply the stick with which
to force-feed Hussein the carrot.
Early on
in the political wrangling, the president’s press secretary and legal
counsel made a half-hearted attempt to argue that the president didn’t
really need congressional approval to go to war anyway. But President
Bush quickly retrieved that trial balloon. Deep down he probably knew he
would eventually need a congressional resolution to comply with the
legal wrinkle of Article I of the Constitution, which gives Congress the
power to declare war. But more pressing for Bush was to forge a
political foundation on which to stand.
The
president had a choice: He could go to the American people and Congress
first or to the United Nations first. Knowing that the U.N. debate would
likely drag out for weeks, maybe months, Bush realized that the Nov. 5
elections would likely come and go before any resolution was hammered
out there.
And there’s
the rub. With control of the House and the Senate very much in play—a
one-seat difference in the Senate and six-seat difference in the House—the
odds of prevailing in the Congress after the election looked dicey. In
choosing to get the debate moving and decided before Nov. 5, Bush had
the political leverage he needed. The president was well aware that
anyone voting against giving him military authority would pay for it in
the voting booth. The pressure was especially acute given the fervor of
patriotism that has come over the nation after the attacks of Sept. 11.
When President Bush made the rhetorical effort, however subtle, to
conjoin the issues of terrorism and Iraq, he certainly added to the
momentum of his support. To vote against authorization would be equated
with doing nothing about terrorism. It was a questionable but,
nonetheless, effective link to make.
So, in
the short term and in the national arena, it was a smart move to force
the early vote. But in terms of world politics it was a mistake. By
going after and getting authority for military action prior to the U.N.
resolution, Bush sent a signal to the world community. It was to say not
only can we act unilaterally, but we will, regardless of any vote by the
Security Council. Implicit in this stance is an attitude of arrogance.
What’s more, it implies the irrelevance of other U.N. nations. It is
precisely what the world has been telling us about our foreign policy of
late.
And, in
fact, it is unlikely the Bush administration would quibble with this
assessment. The policy is laid out very clearly in the recently
published 33-page document titled "The National Security Strategy
of the United States of America." This is a foreign policy paper
that the president is legally required to produce on a regular basis.
The
strategy paper lays out two key themes: one, that the U.S. will employ
pre-emptive action against rogue states and terrorists and, two, that we
should never allow the military supremacy of the U.S.—a fallout of the
Cold War—to be challenged. In the words of the authors of the
document: "The president has no intention of allowing any foreign
power to catch up with the huge lead the United States has opened since
the fall of the Soviet Union more than a decade ago. Our forces will be
strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military
build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United
States."
Both
themes represent profound shifts in our approach to the world.
Deterrence has been the philosophy since the beginning of the Cold War.
And, in one regard, Bush is quite right: Deterrence is a moot point in
the modern world. Deterrence is predicated on self-interest and rational
behavior, neither of which come into play when we are dealing with
terrorists. For deterrence to work, the powers involved have to have
something to lose. A terrorist group comprising martyrs and without a
state does not fit into the equation.
The
trouble Bush will face with pre-emptive action is the arbitrary nature
of it. Now that North Korea, another member of the illustrious
"axis of evil," has admitted to carrying out a nuclear weapons
program, in defiance of a 1994 agreement with the U.S., shouldn’t we
strike them? They are as much a threat to us and our allies as is Iraq.
No doubt there are other countries trying to develop chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons. We can’t wage war against everybody,
so how do we decide whom to obliterate?
The
second theme of our strategy is equally troubling. It not only asserts
the military dominance of the U.S. in the world, but it dictates that we
will maintain a unilateral world through military might. Will we, again
arbitrarily, decide that a certain nation is getting powerful enough to
warrant a military strike? Where do we draw that line, and who draws it?
Both
themes are bold approaches to a dynamic and difficult world situation.
But they also unnecessarily paint us into a war-mongering corner. Almost
by definition, strategies and policies demand a certain degree of
consistency. With such a far-reaching policy, we are going to find
consistency illusive, if not impossible to maintain.
The Bush
administration is taking the stance that since we are much more powerful
than the rest of the world, we will not only be the world’s policeman,
but we will be its judge as well. For the most part, our nation has
always done the right thing when it comes to the world stage. We have
been, in general, forthright and moral over the course of time. That is
not to say we will be impeccably moral or infallible in the future. In
the end, we are telling the world, "Trust us."
It’s a
leap of faith and one the other nations of the world are being told to
take over an ever-widening gap.