The OSI threatens
more than our enemies
Commentary by Adam
Tanous
It is not hard to
imagine how France, say, would react to our trying to influence their
internal politics and foreign policy, especially if we were to use false
information in the cause.
Suddenly
covert is cool again. It didn’t take long for the pendulum to swing back
after the Iran-Contra shenanigans were exposed. Promises for full
disclosure and a new openness in government was a brief flirtation.
For now we
have a spectacularly bad idea from the Department of Defense: The Office
of Strategic Influence. Even the Orwellian name seems ill-conceived.
This new
office—the scope of its duties are still being debated, secretly—is to
provide news and information to foreign media groups in both friendly and
unfriendly countries. The news and information this office provides may or
may not be true. As far as I can tell it is a bizarre conjoining of
"Psychological Operations," the latest darling of the Army, and
its public affairs division.
Established
in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the OSI is directed by
Brig. Gen. Simon P. Worden of the Air Force. Its budget comes out of a $10
billion emergency supplement to the Pentagon budget that Congress
appropriated in October.
It is not
unusual for the military to employ information as part of its arsenal
during wartime. Leaflets were dropped and radio messages were broadcast
over Afghanistan recently. In the Gulf War, the U.S. was very visible in
its amphibious training operations, even though it never intended to
invade over the beach. Vice President Cheney said in a Fresno, Calif.,
speech recently that the "Iraqis tied up five or six divisions
defending the beach in Kuwait City."
This new
office, however, plans to go much beyond these examples by bombarding
allied nations in the Middle East, Asia and Western Europe with strategic
information.
The New
York Times reported last week on some of the classified proposals. These
include:
Outside
sources without obvious ties to the Pentagon would be used to leak both
news items and disinformation with foreign media organizations.
The office
would send journalists, civic leaders and foreign leaders e-mail messages
with phony return addresses trumpeting American positions and attacking
those of unfriendly governments.
Other
efforts would include computer network attacks and radio broadcasts
intended to simulate local news programs.
So what’s
wrong with all of this?
Primarily,
it is a problem of distinctions. In the past we have employed information
warfare against our enemies only, whether in World War II or the Gulf War.
The OSI is
proposing that the distinctions between friend and foe be considered
immaterial. This means, of course, we can plant false information in the
Times of London or with Agence France-Presse. We might send propaganda to
civic leaders in Israel or Germany in trying to influence policy making.
From a
diplomatic standpoint, such a tack would be disastrous. It is not hard to
imagine how France, say, would react to our trying to influence their
internal politics and foreign policy, especially if we were to use false
information in the cause.
Another
wrinkle is that distinguishing between friendly nations and unfriendly
ones is becoming difficult to do. Now that terrorist organizations have
been found to span dozens of countries, friendly and not, how do we deal
with the cancerous nature of terrorism? Terrorists don’t stick to
national boundaries. It is now known that a number of terrorists worked
out of Hamburg, Germany. Should we go to information war with Germany? Do
we kill the patient to get the cancerous cells?
What’s
even a thornier issue is how to control any misinformation the OSI might
disseminate. Again, imagine that the office surreptitiously planted false
information in the foreign press. With a lightning-quick and
interconnected media network out there, misinformation would surely end up
in American media as well. If that were to happen, it would be impossible
to know what was true and what was not.
Once there
is even the faintest doubt in the minds of readers or viewers about a news
organization, the game is lost. Truth and credibility can not exist in a
world of degrees.
Then there
is the credibility of the government to worry about. With the OSI as an
entity of the Pentagon authorized to use both the military’s public
affairs resources and to carry out covert and potentially deceptive
activities, who’s to know what’s what? Would there ever again be a
legitimate Pentagon press briefing? It took more than 30 years for the
Pentagon to build up the public’s trust again after they under-reported
body counts during the Vietnam War. And credibility in government, or lack
thereof, has much greater import than we generally give it credit. Without
the public trust, our government has absolutely no leverage on the
international stage.
All this
talk of the OSI may just be a trial balloon—an idea floated about to
test the domestic and international reaction. Maybe that’s how
politicians think. Even so, just floating the idea can be a
self-fulfilling prophesy in a way. Once the seed is planted that an arm of
the government may be in the business of deceiving friends and foes alike,
we start to wonder. Skepticism spreads like a virus.
It’s easy
to take truth for granted in this country. We have a lot of watchdogs out
there—journalists dedicated to the truth, to the point of risking their
lives for it. Witness Daniel Pearl.
The
historical record survives because thousands of independent journalists
verify all that supposedly happens. It is their job to ferret out the
difference between fact and fiction. When an entity as big and as
coordinated in its efforts as the U.S. government starts to blur the two,
our only frame of reference, truth, falls away.