Building a road
out of the rubble
Commentary by ADAM TANOUS
The neo cons were right.
For those not calibrated to the current
political jargon, that would mean the neo conservatives.
The neo cons are a group of leading
voices—some in government, some not—who currently have significant political
cachet. In government these would be people like Assistant Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, Cheney and
Rumsfeld—neither of whom by now need introduction. The out-of-government neo
cons comprise people like Richard Perle, Kenneth Adelman, Henry Kissinger, Newt
Gingrich and George P. Shultz.
The basic argument of the neo cons, who
lobbied strongly for an invasion of Iraq, was that the war would be a matter of
weeks—to use Adelman’s term in a Washington Post opinion piece, a "cakewalk."
While I think that his choice of words is a little crass—especially from the
perspective of those who died in the conflict—he was basically right. I
personally thought it would take several months and turn into a quagmire. I was
sure we would get sucked into the back alleys of Baghdad and then the chemicals
and biological agents we’ve heard so much about would start flying. Which, of
course, begs the question: Why didn’t he use them? I doubt it was his moral
compunction. Anyone who sanctions murder and torture of the grisliest kind can
hardly be worried about the morality of his actions in war.
In my own meager defense, Adelman, as a
member of the Defense Policy Board, has access to classified information and I
don’t. Which is the great rub of debating issues of national security. It is, to
use another piece of hip jargon, an "asymmetric" debate. When not all the
information is on the table, debate sort of sputters.
This was one of the difficulties of our
diplomatic effort before the war. The administration strongly hinted that it had
incontrovertible evidence of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq. It was also evidence, unfortunately, that they weren’t willing to share
with anyone outside a tight circle of power. Secretary of State Collin Powell
made a valiant effort at the U.N., but it was obvious his boss and those in the
CIA had him on a short leash when it came to hard information. Though Powell,
himself, was very convincing, the slides and diagrams he was allowed to show
were a little too vague and cartoonish for the skeptics to swallow.
So in the diplomatic end, the American
public took a lot on faith, and it paid off.
Watching the Iraqis people storm the
streets last week in jubilation, was moving, to say the least. It was as if the
leaden atmosphere lifted; people could breathe again. To see freedom expressed
in joyful faces is to learn all over again how precious and basic it is.
We are now in the midst of the gleaming
moment, that instant between the destruction of a despot and the creation of a
nation. It is obvious that the military was prepared, thought through their plan
and executed it efficiently. The men and women on the ground won the war on two
fronts. They were the ones who dodged the bullets, dealt with land mines and
snipers and suicide bombers. But on another front, they won the bigger war of
credibility and trust by the manner in which they carried out their orders. With
few exceptions, the troops were humble in their conquest of a hated regime. They
handled a profoundly difficult situation—the intermingling of civilian and
military personnel—with more skill than one could be expected.
We are now, however, faced with a
profoundly complex task: creating a nation from the rubble. At this moment in
time, Iraq is a country with absolutely no infrastructure: no basic supplies
like water and electricity, no police, no system of government, let alone a
functioning one, no real health care system, no economy but for the black
market. And, in a way, given the despotic nature of Saddam’s decades-long rule,
the country really has no sense of itself. So much of its character—the voices
of its people—was stifled for so long, it is hard to know who or what Iraq is.
And that’s why how we proceed from here is
so critical for Iraq and for us.
In the first instance, how do we create a
nation without the identifiable stamp of the U.S. on it? The country doesn’t
even have a serviceable constitution, or body of law from which to proceed.
Presumably we will be helping the Iraqi people create such a document and the
governmental bodies that follow from it—judicial, legislative, and electoral
systems. One can only hope the administration has a plan for establishing a new
nation as detailed as for the military operation. But beyond a good plan, we
need—as in the military operation—finesse in implementing it. The quickest way
to create resentment in Iraq and in the Arab world in general would be to create
a mini America in the Mid East. Certainly we should hope for and encourage a
representative government, but it should be one that is distilled through the
Iraqi culture. Which means that the governmental system and the leaders that
emerge may not be ideal in our eyes. However, trying to influence too strongly
that process will doom them and us.
Aside from the fate of Iraq, why does it
matter how we proceed? Largely because most of the nations of the world—though
put off by our bilateral action with Britain—are withholding judgement until a
road out of the rubble is built. Is the U.S. just an arrogant bully out for oil,
reconstruction contracts and to settle an old score? Or did we do all this to
liberate a people, to save the world from weapons of mass destruction? I think
the latter is probably true, but our task—since we didn’t do it before the
war—is to convince the world it’s true now.
As much as everyone wants to get our
troops out of there quickly, we would be better served to stay: to pour money
and energy and thought into getting Iraq moving forward. Not only will our
benevolent actions convince the world of our intentions, but also the manner in
which we execute those actions is paramount. Oddly, the old standby virtues of
humility and respect for others can go a long way in determining the success of
our efforts. So far the military has done a remarkable job of waging a war while
keeping those virtues in tact. As the rebuilding of the nation begins, the
military will have less influence on the course of events and the political
figures will have more. Let’s hope they can maintain that fine line between the
benevolent nation of wealth and the overbearing parent.
Ultimately, where and how we walk that
line will influence not only Iraq’s future but also the security of our own
nation. It’s hard to imagine the spotlight shining any brighter on us. We have
the opportunity to astound all those staring in or, conversely, to enrage them.